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SANFORD LEVINSON’S OUR UNDEMOCRATIC CONSTITUTION

A Constitution for Our Generation?
Carol Nackenoff
Thomas Jefferson wrote to James Madison from Paris on
September 6, 1789 that “no society can make a perpetual
constitution, or even a perpetual law. The earth belongs always
to the living generation. They may manage it then, and what proceeds from it, as they please, during their usufruct.”1 Jefferson
expressed the view that, not only should each generation be able
to choose the laws under which it is governed, but that the power
of repeal is in no way equal to the power to choose anew:

Americans well today. I assigned this text to undergraduates
at Swarthmore this past fall, and it did, indeed, provoke them
to think new thoughts and to examine constitutional arrangements anew. Two decades ago, in Constitutional Faith, Levinson
asked, “Is there anything built into the definition of law (or,
more crucially, of the Constitution) that guarantees that it will
necessarily be worthy of respect?”5 Blind veneration is not,
Levinson argues, the proper basis for respect by citizens in a
democracy; examination, critical reflection, and an assessment
It may be said that the succeeding generation exercising in
of performance in light of current conditions and needs is what
fact the power of repeal, this leaves them as free as if the conis necessary. For Levinson, law achieves moral force when
stitution or law had been expressly limited to 19 years only.
it stems from willful desire.6 Levinson would likely second
In the first place, this objection admits the right, in proposing
John Stuart Mill’s insistence that failure to subject beliefs to
an equivalent. But the power of repeal is not an equivalent.
examination and vigorous defense was unsuitable and even danIt might be indeed if every form of government were so pergerous for enlightened, self-governing
fectly contrived that the will of the
people.7 And indeed, Levinson, like
majority could always be obtained
Levinson possesses a real faith
Mill and his enlightenment forefathers
fairly and without impediment. But
that a new constitutional conventhat included Jefferson, believes in and
this is true of no form. The people
tion, if convened, would alter the
cannot assemble themselves; their
desires progress in politics. Civilization
Constitution in ways he would conrepresentation is unequal and vicious.
follows upon the heels of barbarism,
sider more democratic. As a Political
Various checks are opposed to every
and societies should re-examine and
legislative proposition. Factions get
Scientist, I need to introduce a few
cast off old institutions when the old no
possession of the public councils.
cautions.
longer serve.8 If we live in a democratic
Bribery corrupts them. Personal interage and the Constitution we inherited is
ests lead them astray from the general
insufficiently
democratic,
then we owe it to ourselves, and preinterests of their constituents; and other impediments arise
sumably to future generations, to remove constitutional ‘imperso as to prove to every practical man that a law of limited
fections’ and ‘stupidities.’
duration is much more manageable than one which needs a
2
In this highly accessible reflection, Our Undemocratic
repeal.
Constitution challenges Americans to propose a constitutional
Jefferson understood the difficulty of overcoming entrenched
convention in order to make America more democratic and egaliinterests. And his remark foreshadowed the difficulty of change
tarian. Levinson possesses a real faith that a new constitutional
through the processes outlined in the Article V amendment
convention, if convened, would alter the Constitution in ways he
clauses—clauses which also prohibit one of the very changes
would consider more democratic. As a Political Scientist, I need
critics such as Robert Dahl and Sanford Levinson have been
to introduce a few cautions. Those who care the most deeply
advocating, namely, that “no State, without its Consent, shall be
about, and have perhaps already mobilized intensively around,
3
deprived of its equal Suffrage in the Senate.” Though Jefferson
particular constitutional reforms are the ones most likely to
was concerned with the conditions necessary to maintain the
invest time and attention in this process. They are likely to have
kind of citizens who were capable of self-government, he was
built think-tanks and to have cultivated funding sources to wage
not afraid of considered political change.4
their campaigns. The reforms Levinson advocates need to be
Sanford Levinson strikes a distinctly Jeffersonian posture in
backed by equally powerful and intense movements. Moreover,
Our Undemocratic Constitution. Realizing the massive difficulcurrent arrangements invest certain actors and interests with
ties standing in the way of some of the reforms he urges readers
benefits they will likely mobilize to protect, and fear of discrete
to consider, he nevertheless provokes a wide audience to ask
or tangible loss helps mobilize actors far more effectively than
themselves whether the arrangements endorsed in 1787 serve
hope of a more remote or less tangible gain.9
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Might a constitutional convention propose that life begins
at conception? That gay marriage become unconstitutional,
pre-empting the states? Could a convention bar the federal
government from burdening states with unfunded mandates, or
require that the federal government balance its annual budgets,
just as many states are required by law to do? Might it stipulate
that any regulation negatively impacting the value or anticipated
revenue from private property constitute a “taking” requiring just
compensation? Might a convention strip the federal courts of particular types of jurisdiction, or end the practice of judicial review
altogether (and should that bother us)? Could the commerce
clause be redefined in a convention so that the reach of the federal government under this clause be drastically curtailed? Might
the doctrine of state sovereignty infuse the 10th Amendment
with new force, perhaps simply beginning the Amendment
“the powers not expressly delegated to the United States…?”
Might the delegates to a new convention tighten up the necessary and proper clause along the same lines? Could Americans
choose to mandate the teaching of creationism in public schools
or require school prayer? And is it conceivable that the convention would bar immigration, especially from certain regions,
ethnicities, or classes? What might result from a constitutional
convention, absent laborious and long-term mobilization, could
be frightening for many liberals and progressives, and for others
who do not think that a mandated devolution of power from the
national government to the states is appropriate (no matter how
important local and regional initiatives) in an era of increasing
globalization and multilateral decision-making.
Not all of the proposals suggested in Our Undemocratic
Constitution have the same force or weight. They certainly did not
resonate equally with my students—for instance, students failed to
get excited over age and residency requirements.10 Nevertheless,
Levinson’s assertions about the ways the Constitution serves to
impede the development of democracy are highly provocative.
And he surely makes an important assertion for students of
American politics: that democratic aspirations meet structural
impediments in the United States. If there are reasons why the
Constitution discourages citizens or some groups of citizens
from feeling invested in the political process, it is a problem for
advocates of democracy and civic engagement.
I want to embellish Levinson’s reflection this way: does the
Constitution, for one or several reasons, suppress political participation and the quality of democratic deliberation in America? If
so, what can and should be done to change these dynamics? Do
the changes envisioned require an overhaul of the Constitution?
While the last question would appear to require an answer in the
affirmative, it is also possible that current arrangements, integrated in the fabric and tradition of our political system, in fact
have no sacrosanct constitutional status. Could they then, with
political will, be reconstructed in some alternate way?
30

I want to focus on the system by which we elect the
president—a system that Levinson calls dreadful and
Byzantine.11 In 2008, a number of states experienced record
turnout in caucuses and primaries, especially Democratic
turnout. African Americans and young voters turned out in
November in robust numbers, offsetting a decline among some
groups of white voters. The upturn in youth voting appeared
to extend a modest but discernable trend following a lengthy
decline in political participation of young cohorts. Interest in
the race was high for reasons extending beyond race. America
elected the first black president. Predicted debacles did not
materialize (no Ohio 2004 or Florida 2000). So why worry
about a system that can work like this?
A trip I made to Kazakhstan in October to speak about the
upcoming American elections occasioned further on our own electoral process. I read a report of complaints about the transparency
and accountability of elections in Kazakhstan leveled by the
Office of Democratic Institutions and Human Rights of the
Organization for Security and Cooperation in Europe [OSCE]
so that I could think comparatively about election problems and
the kinds of issues that might best engage students and activists there.12 I also discovered that, in 2004, OSCE observers
in Florida had said that they had less access to the polls than
in Kazakhstan.13 Our processes—for indeed, it would be an
overstatement even to claim that each state had a single set of
rules and procedures—discourage many Americans from participating. As the OSCE report on the 2004 U.S. election notes,
with variations even at the county level (ballot design; choice of
election technology), “there are a significant number of different legal regimes determining the manner in which elections are
conducted.”14
In Bush v. Gore, the Court asserted that “The individual
citizen has no federal constitutional right to vote for electors
for the President of the United States unless and until the state
legislature chooses a statewide election as the means to implement its power to appoint members of the Electoral College.”15
Since South Carolina was the last state to accord this privilege
to voters in 1868, it was surprising to hear the Court’s claim: had
not the Constitution been informally amended by practice, so
that states could not withdraw this “right”? The fact that there
is no federal constitutional right to vote has a variety of other
ramifications in the American electoral process. There are many
disparities in the likelihood that one’s vote will count, or even
in the likelihood that one will even be able to cast a vote. While
the Voting Rights Act affords federal protection from a number
of recognizable practices that discriminate on the basis of race
(or linguistic community), it leaves in place many other kinds of
intentional and unintentional barriers to effective voting. As the
2004 OSCE report notes, generally, federal law provides only
minimal standards for voter protection and enfranchisement.
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The 1993 National Voter Registration Act (Motor Voter) was
or driver’s licenses, and that casting provisional ballots and then
designed to make voter registration easier by mandating that
having to travel to produce the required documentation within
registration be available at a variety of federal facilities as well
ten days of the election was a costly burden. Nevertheless, the
as providing for easy enrollment when applicants seek state
Supreme Court rejected a facial challenge to the Indiana law in
driver’s licenses. The 2002 Help America Vote Act (HAVA) was
Crawford v. Marion County Election Board (2008).17 Only the
dissenting justices (Souter, Ginsberg, and Breyer) thought that
a bipartisan federal initiative to address problems highlighted
the state’s interest in passing such a law (ostensibly vote fraud)
by the 2000 election, mandating statewide voter registrarequired some evidence or demonstration when placing such a
tion databases, providing funds for improvements in election
substantial burden on the right to vote. For the Court’s majority,
machinery, and introducing provisional ballots throughout the
in an opinion penned by Justice Stevens, the state’s interest in
United States, implementation of key provisions left a great
counting only the votes of eligible voters was held to be obvideal to state discretion. There were far more carrots than sticks.
ously legitimate and important.
And what one hand gave, another sought to take away. Every
A federally protected right to vote for president might also
effort to expand access to the franchise seems to mobilize the
help put an end to state practices of long term felony disenfranopposition in the name of protecting the integrity of the politichisement. Properly articulated, it would help put the federal
cal process. Of course there are partisan motives to such claims,
government imprimatur squarely on the side of fairness and
because first-time, low-income, or low-information voters have
uniformity. It is not merely the case that convicted felons are
particular (or assumed) characteristics and partisanship. Thus,
barred from voting while incarcerated in all but a couple of
the Justice Department under President Bush embarked on an
states; in many states, those paroled or on probation are still
assault on voter fraud, targeting individuals for the first time
denied the right to vote, and in a significant number of states,
(not just conspiracies). A New York Times report indicated that,
former offenders remain barred from
in five years, there was virtually no
voting for life. As the OSCE notes, it
evidence of organized efforts to skew
Can simple legislation and currently
is hard to view some of these restricelections and that of the hundred or so
imaginable constitutional amendtions on the franchise as reasonable
prosecutions (mostly of Democrats),
ments help us invigorate democracy
and proportionate.18 These ballot
most involved individuals who misunand enhance democratic delibrestriction measures, some of which
derstood eligibility rules or mistakenly
eration as a step in the process of
date to the aftermath of the Civil War
filled out multiple registration forms.
change? I believe the generation of
and which again have partisan purThe Justice Department net caught up a
a federal constitutional right to
poses, were not when instituted and
few ex-felons who mistakenly believed
vote is one such imaginable and
are not now race-neutral practices.
they were eligible to vote and a few
possible
step.
Felon disenfranchisement constitutes
immigrants who filled out proffered
a kind of civil death that contributes
voter registration forms when renewto the demobilization, depoliticization, and disempowerment
ing their driver’s licenses or who believed that, since they
of a number of American citizens. We can at least demand
had applied for citizenship, they could fill out a registration
that these practices be ended for purposes of federal elections.
form received in the mail (at least one of these persons was
Here, in part because of the mention of disenfranchisement in
deported).16 Prosecutions and jailings certainly send a message
connection with crimes in the Fourteenth Amendment and the
that stand to inhibit participation by those who are, indeed, eliCourt’s reading of the equal protection clause in the matter
gible to vote but where misinformation about eligibility (e.g.,
of felon disenfranchisement in Richardson v. Ramirez, we
unpaid fines and parking tickets) may prevail. The furor over
probably will want to amend the Constitution to secure this
ACORN’s highly mobilized voter registration efforts in 2008,
federal protection.
resulting in some multiple registrations, masks the fact that
Under Article I §4, Congress retains power to make or alter
there are very few known cases of voters trying to cast ballots
the “times, places, and manner of holding elections for Senators
in multiple states.
and Representatives,” that are prescribed in each State by the
Indiana was one of several states to implement a law requirLegislature thereof. There would appear to be adequate constiing a federally or state-issued photo ID for first time voters,
tutional authority for Congress to make uniform federal election
and the 2005 Indiana statute appears to be the most stringent of
processes and provisions (“except as to the Places of chusing
these laws. Opponents contended that elderly citizens and some
Senators,”) extending as well to presidential elections, and yet it
disabled persons would have trouble obtaining birth certificates
seems unwilling to do so. We should move to take time, place,
that would allow them to obtain a free state-issued photo identiand manner power from the states in order to make sure that the
fication, that many of these same people did not have passports
Volume 18, Number 1, 2009
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federal constitutional right to vote is equal, fair, and uniform and
place this among the powers of Congress. If there is no political
will, then citizens should join Sandy Levinson in demanding
a constitutional convention that would articulate this federal
protection of the right to vote as a component of citizenship in
the United States, and that would stipulate what a guaranteed
federal right to vote for president and other federal officials
should include.
A constitutionally protected federal right to vote as a guarantee pertaining to U.S. citizenship would prompt federal rules
under which votes in federal elections are cast, counted, and
recounted. The federal government could take over administration of most aspects of federal elections directly. Or, at a minimum, the federal government could hold accountable state actors
who fail to provide numerous, well-advertised polling places
with sufficient, adequate and reliable equipment and trained
poll workers to eliminate multiple hour waits at the polls, and it
could furthermore insist on uniform rules for voter identification, provisional ballots, and early voting. A robust rights-based
guarantee should lead to more vigorous federal prosecution of
vote suppression activities, even if they were not aimed at voters
on the basis of race or language minority group. In crafting language for a constitutional revision, it would be wise to make sure
that nonstate actors who engage in misinformation and suppression activities would also be subject to federal law.19 If we came
to see this right as one worthy of robust federal protection, we
might more easily make federal election days national holidays
or experiment with multi-day elections to enhance participation.
We should be generous in insuring that federal ballot access
for minor parties is not encumbered (e.g., by rules governing
nominating petitions). Allowing choice rather than constraining
it should be a goal of reforms.
It is important to recognize that the most significant factors
depressing voter turnout in the United States are registrationrelated barriers to voting. If turnout is calculated among those
registered to vote, around 86 percent of those registered claim to
have voted in 2000 and 89 percent in the 2004 election.20 Even
accounting for the problem of self-reporting in surveys, it is clear
that turnout among the registered is robust. It is also clear that a
good number of would-be voters are turned away from the polls
because voting lists fail to show their names, and rules for counting of provisional ballots are not necessarily going to solve voter
list problems. If voters vote in the wrong precinct, or have moved
close to election time, all bets are off in a system in which decisions about whether to count such votes are decentralized.21
While we are working on equalizing and enhancing participation in the electoral process, we had better join Levinson in
proposing elimination of the Electoral College. This institution,
for which Levinson constructs ‘parade of horribles’ scenarios
(frightening enough to contemplate) does, indeed, distort the
32

way in which votes count, privileging the voices of voters in
states with smaller populations. In this sense, Levinson, like
Robert Dahl, is concerned about differential formal weighting of
votes, and both recognize the insurmountable obstacle to reform
posed by the Senate.22 Unlike Dahl, Levinson is also concerned
with a number of mischiefs that the Electoral College system
could produce. But the Electoral College has other consequences
worth considering. It has a tendency to depress or distort voter
interest and turnout in presidential elections. This should also be
of concern to those who seek to facilitate democratic aspirations
through a constitutional convention.
Political scientists recognize that citizens are more likely to
take an interest in presidential elections and to vote when there
is an active campaign going on where they live.23 The Electoral
College system for allocation of the votes that actually matter
cause many states and congressional districts to be ignored by
campaigns; either a candidate is sure to win, or sure to lose, that
state or congressional district.24 Meanwhile, battleground states
and specific counties within those states are lavished with attention from candidates and their surrogates.25 A relatively small
number of states are deluged with media buys and campaign
stops, while others might not know a campaign is going on from
these indicators.26 The timing of primaries further privileges
some voters. While residents of New Hampshire, who ultimately
wield four electoral votes, are overrun with candidates who visit
their towns or living rooms during primary season, residents of
some states have rarely if ever been courted by candidates.27 Of
course 2008 was an interesting anomaly for the Democrats; since
the battle for the nomination extended even beyond the time the
last primary and caucus votes were cast, candidates campaigned
heavily in closely contested late primary states, and interest in
the election among potential Democratic voters remained high.
In general, areas where candidates are invisible, where campaign
advertisements do not run, and where the election seems remote,
participation and electoral turnout are lower.28 If and when the
potential electorate is mobilized, interest in issues and in politics
is higher.29 Because the existence of the Electoral College shapes
the strategic behavior of presidential candidates, it also leads to
selective mobilization of voters and actually demobilizes many
potential voters. I would argue that its effect is undemocratic in
this sense as well as the more traditional argument about bean
counting.
Under the current system, there is virtually no incentive to
mobilize citizens who do not participate, since the object is
not to maximize overall vote totals for a candidate but rather
to win the state. Contemporary parties are unlikely to seek to
mobilize those who do not participate since these nonparticipants do not simply mirror the electorate and they introduce a
great deal of uncertainty into election outcomes.30 It could even
be argued that the Electoral College system gives parties and
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candidates a disincentive to pay attention to specific interests of
African Americans or Latinos because they are unlikely, in most
elections, to shift the outcome in the state as a whole.31 And
George C. Edwards has demonstrated that the interests of small
states are hardly served by the Electoral College system, since
candidates who focus on highly competitive states with large
numbers of electoral votes often neglect small states in their time
and resource allocation—and also ignore local issues in such
states.32 The political conversation might be altered by elimination of the Electoral College, but there is little if any reason to
believe it would be altered for the worse.
When the Electoral College was created as a compromise
mechanism during the final days of the Constitutional Convention,
it reflected, in part, fears that the populace could not be trusted
to make good decisions and would not know candidates outside
their own states or regions.33 The founders did not invent it
as a further device to protect state interests, and probably did
not envision the current system in which all state electors are
expected to vote as a bloc (another informal amendment to the
Constitution). As John Roche argues, the framers were pragmatists and the Electoral College “was merely a jerry-rigged
improvisation which has subsequently been endowed with a high
theoretical content….”34
If the Electoral College vanishes, a vote would be a vote
wherever it were cast throughout the country. Edwards’s examination of current practices and the manner in which the Electoral
College shapes these supports Robert Dahl’s claim that “in a system of direct election where every citizen’s vote is given equal
weight, presidential candidates will be even more eager than they
are now to win votes wherever they might be available; and the
closer they expect the election to be, the more eagerly they will
search out those votes.”35 So long as parties remain reasonably
competitive on the national level, they will have an incentive to
campaign vigorously across the country under a system of direct
election.

Conclusion
There are a number of other reforms that could enhance
interest in public affairs and elections and promote civic
engagement in the United States, but my point has been to
indicate that a good deal of mileage could likely be obtained
by these few strategic reforms. And there is considerable public support for such changes. The Senate, as Levinson knows,
is likely to remain the graveyard for these changes, especially
because of their perceived impact on the interests of smaller
states. For Levinson, the framers’ intent is not sacrosanct.
However, what the framers created does function like an iron
cage with almost kryptonite-like bars.36 Is the Constitution,
indeed, paralyzing democracy?

Levinson seriously engages the difficulties in calling a new
constitutional convention to address democratic defects of our
current Constitution and suggests the possible use of Fishkin-type
deliberative polling to build a movement for reform.37 Based on
my own experiences with citizen forums, I recognize the value
of such guided face-to-face discussions. But the exercises also
underline the point that thoughtful democracy requires a great
deal of time and investment from citizens. Our political culture
tends to downplay obligations of citizenship in its overwhelming emphasis upon individual rights.38 Moreover, the pace of
life in the United States at the dawn of the 21st century seems
to make time ever more scarce for people ranging from professionals to workers holding down multiple part-time jobs. These
tendencies seem to be at war with the considered, careful deliberation that is inclusive of all sorts of citizens and interests that
Levinson’s democratic aspirations are founded upon, and must
also be addressed in the public sphere. Does my observation
mean I believe that change is impossible? I would not go so far.
But the change Levinson wants requires creating new citizens in
the process—citizens who think and imagine anew.
Our Constitution and the informal amendments we live with
have helped to shape us as citizens. Can simple legislation and
currently imaginable constitutional amendments help us invigorate democracy and enhance democratic deliberation as a step
in the process of change? I believe the generation of a federal
constitutional right to vote is one such imaginable and possible
step. If we cannot remove the Electoral College by constitutional
amendment, there are imaginable and possible reforms proposed
by states, including a proposal originating in Maryland in 2007
that would bring electoral votes into alignment with the popular
vote, thereby effectively marginalizing the Electoral College.39
If both of these reforms could be made, there is a chance for
significant payoff for the quantity and quality of democratic
participation and deliberation in the United States. From there,
more may well follow. The agenda is modest, but I can indeed
envision it. We may, like Sanford Levinson, share Jeffersonian
sensibilities and aspirations, but we are no longer the yeoman
farmers Jefferson knew.
Carol Nackenoff is Richter Professor of Political Science at
Swarthmore College, where she teaches constitutional law,
American politics, and environmental politics. Most recently she
co-edited a volume, Jane Addams and the Practice of Democracy,
published by the University of Illinois Press.
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